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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12482 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiff-respondent declaring there was 
no coverage for Wendy Harvey under an automobile 
policy of insurance issued to her brother-in-law, Ron-
ald Strang, with whom she resided. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment of the lower court should be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is 
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substantially correct. This restatement of the facts 
is given for further amplification. 
Jacqueline Hamberlin, a widow, was the owner 
of a 1964 Falcon automobile. Her daughter, Debra, 
age 15 years, at the time of the accident in question, 
had a learner's permit only and did not have a driv-
er's license. During that month she let the insurance 
on the Falcon expire and advised her daughter, Deb-
ra, that as soon as she obtained her driver's license 
she would renew the insurance on the Falcon and it 
would be available for her daughter, Debra, to drive. 
The Falcon was normally kept in the garage which 
was locked. 
On July 30, 1970, Jacqueline Hamberlin left 
the keys to the garage and to the Falcon on the drain-
board so her son could move some of his personal 
belongings in the garage for storage. On that day 
Mrs. Hamberlin's daughter, Debra, took the Falcon 
without her mother's permission (R 1, 2, 6, 7). She 
picked up her friends, Marsha Wood and Wendy 
Harvey. Neither Wendy nor Marsha had a driver's 
license. 
Prior to July 30, 1970, the day of the accident 
in question, plaintiff issued its policy of automobile 
liability insurance to defendant, Ronald F. Strang, 
as the named insured (R 1, 6). The defendant, 
Kathryn Strang, is the wife of Ronald F. Strang 
and a member of his household. Defendant, Wendy 
Harvey, age 15 years, is the sister of Mrs. Strang 
and resided with and was a member of the household 
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of Mr. and Mrs. Strang on the date of the accident 
(R 1, 6). Wendy had not been through driver's 
training, had not obtained a learner's permit, and 
had never obtained a driver's license prior to the ac-
cident. At the time Debra Hamberlin picked up her 
two friends, Marsha Wood and Wendy Harvey, 
Wendy knew that Debra had just obtained her learn-
er's permit but did not have her driver's license. She 
was fully aware of the fact that Marsha Wood and 
herself did not have driver's licenses and that Deb-
ra, having a learner's permit, was not supposed to 
be driving an antomobile without a licensed driver 
being present therein (Harvey Dep. 17). 
On the day in question Debra permitted Wendy 
to drive the Falcon. While d•:iving it, Wendy col-
lided with Mindalyn Green causing her personal in-
JUries. 
Mindalyn Green and her father, Steven Green, 
claim that Wendy Harvey was insured under the 
policy issued by plaintiff to Ronald F. Strang. The 
trial court found that Wendy was not an insured 
under the Strang policy and was not entitled to the 
protection thereof. From the trial court's judgment 
so holding, this appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUES-
TION WENDY HARVEY WAS DRIVING THE 
HAMBERLIN AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT THE 
PERMISSION OF THE OWNER AND WITH-
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OUT THE PE R Nr I S S I 0 N OF ANYONE IN 
"LAWFUL POSSESSION" OF THE SAME. 
The insurance policy issued by plaintiff to Ron-
ald F. Strang provides: 
"USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES 
If the named insured is a person or per-
sons, and if during the policy period such nam-
ed insured ovms a moto1· vehicle covered by 
this policy and classified as 'pleasure and bus-
iness,' such insuranc:e as is afforded by this 
policy with respect to the owned 11wtor vehicle 
under: 
( 1) coverages A and B applies to the use 
of a non-owned autonwbile by: 
(a) the first person named in the 
declarations, or, 
(b) if residents of the same house-
hold, his spouse or the relatives 
of either, and 
( c) * * * (not applicable) 
(2) * * * (not applicable) 
PROVIDED SUCH USE, OPERATION OR 
OCCUPANCY IS \\TITH THE PERMISSION 
OF THE OWNER OR PERSON IN LAW-
FUL POSSESSION OF SUCH A UTOMO-
BILE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
SUCH PERMISSION. 
The definition of insured does not apply 
to Use of Non-Owned Automobiles." 
It is admitted by appellant that the operation or 
occupancy of the accident vehicle was without per-
mission of Jacqueline Hamberlin, the owner, (Ap-
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pellant's brief, p. 6). It is also without dispute that 
Debra Hamberlin did not have her mother's permis-
sion to take the Falcon automobile or to operate it 
on the date of the accident (Jacqueline Hamberlin 
Dep. p. 9-12, Debra Hamberlin Dep. p. 5, 6, 11, 14, 
15, 16, R 1, 2, 6, 7). It is without dispute that Wendy 
was driving the accident vehicle with the permission 
of Debra, the 15 year old daughter of the owner. 
The only issue involved on this appeal is the 
question of whether Debra Hamberlin was in law-
ful possession of her mother's automobile and there-
fore one who could give permission for another to 
drive the same. This court in Ashton v. Joyner, 17 
Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306, had occasion to consider 
a case involving an issue almost identical with the 
issue involved in this case. Mr. Joyner was the own-
er of a truck. While Mr. Joyner and his wife were 
out of town, his 13 year old son, without permission 
or authority, took the truck in question and while 
driving the same was involved in an accident. The 
policy in question had an exclusion for any drivers 
under the age of 25 other than the insured's daugh-
ter, Rosalee Joyner. The truck sustained substantial 
damage in the accident. The plaintiff, P. E. Ashton, 
repaired the truck and when the owner, Mr. Joyner, 
did not pay the bill, Ashton brought this action 
against Mr. Joyner to recover for the repair work. 
Mr. Joyner then filed a Third Party Complaint 
against his insurance company, United Pacific, 
claiming that since his son had taken the car without 
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permission, this was a "theft" and that the insurance 
company was liable for the damage under the theft 
provisions of the policy. The insurance company as-
serted the exclusionary rider and in addition claimed 
the taking was not unlawful. There was no claim in 
the Joyner case that the 13 year old boy intended to 
deprive his father of the use of the vehicle on a per-
manent basis. His intent, as in the case now before 
this court, was simply to drive the vehicle and return 
it, which would amount only to temporary depriva-
tion of the use or possession of the automobile. 
The Supreme Court in holding that this was a 
theft as that word was used in the insurance policy, 
observed that under Section 41-1-109, U.C.A. 1953, 
it is a misdemeanor for any person "to drive a vehicle 
not his own, without the consent of the owner, with 
intent temporarily to deprive the owner of his pos-
session and without intent to steal." The court in so 
holding, further said : 
"In view of the foregoing policy, it seems 
more logical and equitable that this court in-
terpret the term 'theft,' as used in the instant 
policy of insurance, as including the wilful 
taking or appropriation of one person's prop-
erty by another, wrongfully and without jus-
tification, with the design to hold or make use 
of such property in violation of the rights of 
the owner." 
The court went on to hold that in order to con-
stitute a "theft" within the meaning of that term 
as used in the insurance policy, that it was not neces-
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sary that the taker have an intent to steal and to 
deprive the owner permanently of his possession. All 
that was required was a taking without the permis-
sion with an intent to deprive the owner temporarily 
of the use or possession. 
Since Debra admittedly did not have the per-
mission of her mother to take the automobile, she was 
not a person in "lawful possession" and therefore 
the permission given by her to Wendy Harvey was 
ineffective and could not bring Wendy within the 
terms of the Strang policy quoted above. 
POINT II 
THE POLICY PROVISIONS DO NOT VIOLATE 
SECTION 41-12-21 (c) U.C.A. 1953. 
The Greens at page 7 of their brief refer to Sec-
tion 41-12-21 (c) U.C.A. 1953 and quote the follow-
ing portion of that statute: 
~'Such operator's policy of liability insur-
ance shall insure the person named as insured 
therein against loss from the liability imposed 
upon him by law for damages arising out of 
the use by him of any vehicle not owned by 
him ... " 
They claim the statute quoted sets forth minimum 
standards of insurance policy coverage and then ar-
gue that since Wendy Harvey comes under the clas-
sification of an insured under the Strang policy, that 
any attempt on the part of State Farm to provide 
coverage in conflict with that statute would be void. 
There are two complete answers to this agrnment. 
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First of all, the quoted statute refers to the "named 
insured." Ronald F. Strang was the named insured 
in the policy issued by plaintiff in this lawsuit. Wen-
dy Harvey was not the named insured. If she is to 
be an insured at all, she would come under the om-
nibus clause of the policy which insures with respect 
to non-owned automobiles 
"if residents of the same household, his spouse 
or the relatives of either." 
PROVIDED THE USE OF THE NON-OWNED 
AUTOMOBILE IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF 
THE OWNER OR THE PERSON IN LAWFUL 
POSSESSION AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
SUCH PERMISSION. 
In this connection it should be noted that the 
same statute quoted by the Greens in subsection (b) 
( 2) provides that the policy shall insure 
"the person named therein and any other per-
son, as insured, using any such motor vehicle 
or motor vehicles with the express or imnlied 
permission of such named insured, * * *" 
The point is that this portion of the statute with re-
spect to the "owned aidonwbile" specifically talks 
about the named insured and omnibus insureds and 
requires that the policy insure not only the named 
insured but any other person driving the owned auto-
mobile with the permission of the named insured. 
Subsection ( c) quoted by appellants, on the other 
hand, is talking only about the named insured. Since 
Wendy Harvey is not the named insured, the statute 
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on its face has no application to the question now be-
fore this court and the policy language is not in con-
flict with the statute. 
A second and equally compelling answer to the 
Greens' argument is the fact that Section 41-12-21 
U. C.A. 1953 has been held by this court in two sep-
arate cases to apply only to cases where one is com-
pelled to secure a policy "after" an accident in order 
to be able to continue to drive his automobile, but does 
not apply to policies written "prior" to the accident. 
The same argument now advanced by the Greens in 
this case was made in Western Casualty and Surety 
Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., et al., 26 Utah 
2d 50, 484 P.2d 1180, 1182. The court in disposing 
of the argument said: 
"We need not dwell on this provision of 
the statute, since it applies only to cases where 
one is compelled to secure a policy after an ac-
cident in order to be able to continue to drive 
his automobile. It pertains to policies secured 
under the Safety Responsibility Act and has 
no application to policies written before any 
accident occurs. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 
v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957). 
The policies involved herein were written 
prior to accident and are to be interpreted the 
same as any other contract. In the Chugg case, 
supra, this court said at page 402 of the Utah 
Reports, 315 P.2d at page 279: 
'It being conceded that the policy was 
not issued because Chugg had been re-
quired by the Commission to furnish proof 
of financial responsibility in conformance 
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with the Act, it follows that the provisions 
of the Act do not apply to it. Unless 
Chugg had been within the purview of the 
~ct when the J?Olicy was issued, its provi-
s10ns, unless illegal, are subject to the 
same construction as any other contract 
in accordance with the exnressed intent 
of the parties. * * *' " , 
The California court in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Flynt, 17 Cal. App. 3d 
538 ( 1971) had occasion to deal with a similar prob-
lem and with policy provisions practically identical 
with the policy that is the subject of this appeal. 
In that case State Farm had issued its policy of 
insurance to Flynt, listing him as the "named insur-
ed" and describing a 1964 Mercury automobile as 
the "owned automobile." Richard Flynt was Fred 
Flynt's sixteen year old step-son who at all times 
resided with his mother and Fred Flynt. While the 
policy was in force, Richard found a 1962 Chevrolet 
automobile with the keys in the ignition, took it with-
out the permission of its owner, and went joy riding 
with a friend. During this joy ride an accident oc-
curred and the friend was injured which resulted 
in the friend filing a suit against Richard Flynt seek-
ing damages for personal injuries. State Farm 
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a de-
claration that 'Richard Flynt was not covered under 
the policy in question. The trial court granted State 
Farm's motion for summary judgment and on appeal 
this was affirmed. In that case Flynt contended that 
the summary judgment in favor of State Farm was 
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improperly granted because, among other things, the 
policy provision relied upon to deny coverage is 
against public policy and not permitted by statute. 
This is the same argument that the Greens are mak-
ing in this case. The court in disposing of this argu-
ment, said: 
"The insurance policy issued by State 
Farm to Fred Flynt contains two separate in-
suring agreements. Insuring Agreement I 
deals with the 'owned automobile;' Insuring 
Agreement II concerns 'non-owned automo-
biles,' Insofar as pertinent here the policy pro-
vides, with emphasis added: 
'INSURING AGREEMENT I - THE 
OWNED AUTOMOBILE 
'To pay * * * all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of (A) bodily in-
jury sustained by other persons, and (B) 
property damage, * * * arising out of the 
* * * use * * * of the owned automobile; 
and to d~f end, * * * any suit against the 
insured alleging such bodily injury or 
property damage and seeking damages 
which are payable hereunder even if any 
of the allegations of the suit are ground-
less, false or fraudulent; * * *' 
[As to Insuring Agreement I, the policy de-
fines the word 'insured' to include:] 
'(1) 
'(2) 
the named insured, and 
if the named insured is a person or 
persons, also includes his or their 
spouse ( s), if a resident of the same 
household, and 
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'(3) 
'( 4) 
'(5) 
if residents of the same household 
the relatives of the first perso~ 
named in the declarations, or of his 
spouse, and 
any other person while using the 
owned automobile, provided the op-
eration and the actual use of such 
automobile are with the permission 
of the named insured or such spouse 
and are within the scope of such per-
mission, and 
* * * ' 
[This definition of insured is not applicable 
to Insuring Agreement IL] 
'INSURING AGREEMENT II - NON-
OWNED AUTOMOBILES 
'* * * such insurance as is afforded by this 
policy with respect to the owned automo-
bile under: 
( 1) coverage A and B [bodily injury and 
property damage] applies to the use 
of a non-owned automobile by: 
(a) the first person named * * * or, 
(b) if residents of the same house-
hold, his spouse or the relatives 
of either, * * * 
(c) 
(2) 
(3) 
* * *· 
' 
[Medical Payments] * * *; 
[Collision and Comprehensive] 
* * *. ' 
provided such use, operation, occupancy 
or custody is with the permission of the 
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owner or person in lawful possession of 
such autonwbile.' " 
The court then considered the statutes relied 
upon by Flynt and concluded, as did this court in 
Western Casualty and Surety Co. and Chugg, supra, 
that the statutes did not apply to policies issued "be-
fore" an accident but did apply to policies issued for 
certification as proof of financial responsibility 
"after" an accident. 
The Greens to further buttress their position 
cite on pages 8 and 9 of their brief two cases as illus-
trative of courts holding there was coverage under 
an insurance policy for drivers notwithstanding the 
criminal taking of the automobile by the driver. The 
cases are clearly distinguishable and have no appli-
cation to the question involved in this case. One of 
the cases cited is State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Walker, 334 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 
1960), involving a situation where State Farm issu-
ed a policy of insurance to Mr. Forrest. Mr. Forrest 
had a Miss Lafoon who was a boarder with the For-
rest family. She was not a member of the family. 
Miss Lafoon owned an automobile which she kept at 
the Forrest home, and this automobile was also in-
sured by a standard form family automobile policy. 
Mr. Forrest's thirteen year old son, without the 
knowledge or consent of anyone, took the Lafoon auto-
mobile and while joy riding around the neighborhood 
was involved in an accident with a parked automo-
bile belonging to Mr. Walker. 
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The pertinent provisions of the Forrest policy 
as they applied to coverage while operating non-own-
ed automobiles are: 
:' (b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, 
( 1) the named insured ; 
(2) any relative, but only with respect 
to a private passenger automobile or 
trail0r not regularly furnished for 
the use of such relative." 
In the TV alker- case coverage is extended with 
respect to a non-'owned automobile to: 
"any relative but only with respect to a pri-
vate passenger automobile er trailer not reg-
ularly furnished for the use of such relative." 
It is obvious this provision is considerably different 
than is the provision involved in this appeal. In the 
case before this court coverage with respect to a non-
owned automobile is extended to: 
"the named insured or a resident of the same 
household, provided such use, operation or oc-
cupancy is with the permission of the owner or 
person in lawful possession of such automobile 
and is within the scope of such permission." 
In the Walker- case there was no requirement 
that the use of the non-owned automobile be with the 
permission of the owner or the person in lawful pos-
session. Coverage in that case was entended to any 
relative while driving a non-owned vehicle so long as 
that vehicle was not regularly furnished for the use 
of such relative. 
14 
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The other case cited by the Greens is Sperling v. 
Great American Indemnity Co., 7 N.Y.2d 442, 199 
N.Y.S.2d 465, 166 N.E.2d 482, 83 A.L.R.2d 929. The 
same policy provisions were the same as were involv-
ed in JV alker. Those provisions were: 
"(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, 
( 1) the named insured; 
(2) any relative, but only with respect 
to a private passenger automobile 
or trailer not regularly furnished 
for the use of such relative." 
The court in Sperling reached the same result 
as in Walker. These two cases are completely dis-
tinguishable from the case now before this court and 
have nothing to do with the issues in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Debra Hamberlin without question was driving 
1 her mother's automobile without her knowledge, con-
sent or permission. Under the holding of this court 
in Ashton, supra, her possession was clearly unlaw-
ful. The policy in question was issued before the ac-
cident and therefore would be construed according to 
its terms. The Safety Responsibility Act has no ap-
plication to a policy issued before the accident. Even 
if the policy had been issued after the accident and 
for the purpose of enabling the driver to continue 
driving his vehicle, the clear wording of Section 41-
12-21 ( c) U.C.A. ( 1953) relied on by appellants in 
this case clearly refers only to the named insured. 
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By its specific terms it did not apply to Wendy Har-
vey, who if she is to be an insured must qualify as 
an omnibus insured. This she cannot do because she 
was not driving the Hamberlin vehicle with the per-
mission of one in lawful possession. 
The judgment of the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
GLENN C. HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintif !-Respondent 
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